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LOSS-AVOIDANCE AND FORWARD INDUCTION IN 
EXPERIMENTAL COORDINATION GAMES 
GERARD P CACHON AND COLIN F. CAMERER 
We report experiments on how players select among multiple Pareto-ranked 
equilibria in a coordination game. Subjects initially choose inefficient equilibria. 
Charging a fee to play (which makes initial equilibria money-losing) creates coor- 
dination on better equilibria. When fees are optional, improved coordination is 
consistent with forward induction. But coordination improves even when subjects 
must pay the fee (forward induction does not apply). Subjects appear to use a 
"loss-avoidance" selection principle: they expect others to avoid strategies that 
always result in losses. Loss-avoidance implies that "mental accounting" of out- 
comes can affect choices in games. 
In games with multiple equilibria that are Pareto-ranked, 
players must somehow coordinate their choices to achieve Pareto 
efficiency. Games of coordination have been widely used in eco- 
nomics to study macroeconomic cycles, technology adoption, 
sticky prices, organizational design, bank runs, and other phe- 
nomena.1 These theories cover a lot of economic ground but 
generally leave unanswered a central question. Why is one equi- 
librium selected rather than another? Experimental analysis is 
well suited to help answer this question because the specialized 
conditions of a coordination game can easily be created in the 
laboratory. Then a wide range of variables can be altered to help 
infer the principles that guide selection of equilibria. In this pa- 
per we describe a new selection principle, called "loss-avoidance," 
and show that the empirical success of a related principle, "for- 
ward induction," is partly attributable to loss-avoidance. 
Table I shows payoffs in a coordination game we study ex- 
perimentally in this paper. Each of nine players privately picks 
an integer between one and seven (inclusive), called an "action." 
After all the players have picked an action, the median of their 
actions is computed and announced. Payoffs are determined by a 
player's action and by the "median action," as shown in Table I. 
(The payoffs are in pennies.) This median-action game was origi- 
nally studied by Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil [1991, 1993] (here- 
inafter VBB). 
1. See Diamond [1982], Bryant [1983], Cooper and Johns [1988], Katz and 
Shapiro [1986], Ball and Romer [1991], Milgrom and Roberts [1990, 1992], Becker 
and Murphy [1992], and Diamond and Dybvig [1983]. 
? 1996 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology. 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 1996. 
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TABLE I 
MEDIAN EFFORT GAME PAYOFF TABLE 
Your Median action 
Action 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 140 150 140 110 60 -10 -100 
2 130 160 170 160 130 80 10 
3 100 150 180 190 180 150 100 
4 50 120 170 200 210 200 170 
5 -20 70 140 190 220 230 220 
6 -110 0 90 160 210 240 250 
7 -220 -90 20 110 180 230 260 
The median-action game has two important features. First, 
players' payoffs are decreasing with the (absolute) difference be- 
tween their own action and the median. Hence, a player's best 
action is to choose the number the player believes will be the me- 
dian (row X in Table I is a best response to column X). Then there 
are seven pure-strategy Nash equilibria, located along the diago- 
nal. Second, the seven pure-strategy equilibria are Pareto- 
ranked: the higher-action equilibria are better for everyone. 
Choosing 7 is the best of all. 
In previous studies, and in our replications, subjects typi- 
cally choose actions that create a median of 4-5 in the first round. 
When the game is played repeatedly, behavior almost always con- 
verges to the first-round median. There is persistent "coordina- 
tion failure" because subjects do not coordinate on the best 
equilibrium and choose 7. 
I. LOSS-AVOIDANCE AS A SELECTION PRINCIPLE 
Previous research has investigated the "selection principles" 
players appear to use, tacitly, to select one of the many possible 
equilibria. For example, the equilibrium in which everyone 
chooses 7 obeys the principle of "payoff-dominance" or Pareto- 
dominance (see Harsanyi and Selten [1988]). But subjects typi- 
cally choose actions that create a median of 4-5 in the first round, 
so payoff-dominance is apparently not a universally accepted 
principle. 
The strong influence of the first round shows that "prece- 
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dence" is a selection principle; namely, subjects believe that an 
equilibrium which has been picked before is more likely to be cho- 
sen again (and their beliefs are self-fulfilling). 
In this paper we describe a new selection principle, which we 
call loss-avoidance. The loss-avoidance principle is that players 
do not pick strategies that result in certain losses for themselves,2 
if other (equilibrium) strategies are available. People only pick 
(and expect others to pick) strategies that might result in a gain. 
To illustrate loss-avoidance, suppose that players in the 
Table I median-action game must pay a commonly known fee of 
225 to play or, equivalently, we subtract 225 from all the payoffs. 
Now the strategies 1-4 are certain to result in a loss. Even 
though 1-4 are still equilibrium choices, the loss-avoidance prin- 
ciple selects them out, and predicts that only 5-7 will be chosen. 
The loss-avoidance principle is a game-theoretic cousin of 
findings from research on individual choice that highlight the 
psychological differences between gains and losses (see Tversky 
and Kahneman [1991]). For example, people appear to dislike 
losses more than they like equal-sized gains ("loss-aversion"), and 
people often seek risk to avoid losses, while avoiding risks that 
can yield equal-sized gains ("reflection"). As a result, the point of 
reference from which gains and losses are evaluated-or the way 
a choice is framed or "mentally accounted" for-can affect the 
choices people make. 
While these features of losses are thought to guide choices 
of individuals, the loss-avoidance principle is distinctly different 
because it guides players' beliefs about the behavior of others. 
The difference is illustrated by some experimental sessions in 
which subjects had to pay a fee of 225, but did not know whether 
others paid the same fee or not. In those sessions, adding a fee 
did not change the choices players made, presumably because 
subjects could not tell which strategies led to sure losses for oth- 
ers, and hence could not use the loss-avoidance principle to shape 
their beliefs about what others would do. 
2. There are two variants of loss-avoidance: (i) subjects avoid strategies that 
have only negative payoffs (losing-strategy avoidance); (ii) subjects avoid strate- 
gies that have negative equilibrium payoffs (losing-equilibrium avoidance). The 
difference is illustrated by strategy 5, when the fee is 225. Choosing 5 yields a 
positive payoff only if the median is 6, so choosing 5 is ruled out by (ii) but not by 
(i). Since 5's are actually chosen with some frequency in the 225 fee periods, we 
think principle (i) is probably more typical than (ii), but further experiments could 
better separate the two variants. 
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II. Loss-AvoIDANcE AND FORWARD INDUCTION 
Now suppose that the choice of whether to pay the 225 fee 
and play the game is optional. Subjects who opt out earn nothing. 
In this case, loss-avoidance is coupled with a stronger selection 
principle, forward induction. In the presence of the option, a sub- 
ject's decision to play a game (rather than opt out) implicitly3 
communicates the subject's expectations concerning the outcome 
of the game: a subject will not choose an action that guarantees 
a lower payoff than what could be earned for sure by opting out. 
This reasoning, called forward induction, is formalized by Kohl- 
berg and Mertens [1986], van Damme [1989], and Ben-Porath 
and Dekel [1992]. Forward induction improves coordination be- 
cause it shrinks the set of plausible equilibria in a game. How- 
ever, experimental evidence on its effectiveness is mixed.4 
Loss-avoidance and forward induction are closely linked. 
Loss-avoidance applies if players assume that others will avoid 
certain losses. Forward induction applies if players assume that 
others will avoid an opportunity loss, by choosing an equilibrium 
which is better for them than an option they chose to forgo. In 
many games the two principles lead to the same set of selected 
strategies. To isolate the effectiveness of loss-avoidance, we stud- 
ied two kinds of median-action games. In games with options to 
opt out, coordination improved, which meant that the combina- 
tion of loss-avoidance and forward induction selected better equi- 
libria. But improved coordination was also observed in games 
with no options and possible losses, where forward induction did 
not apply and loss avoidance did. Hence, we conclude that loss- 
avoidance could explain some of the improvement in coordination 
which previously has been attributed exclusively to forward in- 
duction. Our data add to other experimental evidence that for- 
ward induction works largely because it coincides with other 
3. Several authors have found that some forms of explicit nonbinding preplay 
communication (or "cheap talk") among players can improve coordination. Cooper, 
DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross [1989] find that in battle-of-the-sexes games, allowing 
one player to announce a strategy without a commitment (also known as cheap 
talk) improves coordination, but allowing both players to communicate provides 
little benefits. However, Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross [1992a] find the op- 
posite relationship in a more symmetric coordination game. Van Huyck, Gillette, 
and Battalio [1992] find mixed improvements in coordination when an outside 
arbiter makes recommendations to the players. 
4. Brandts and Holt [1990]; Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil [1993]; and Coo- 
per, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross [1992b] find supporting evidence. But Cooper, 
DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross [1993]; Schotter, Weigelt, and Wilson [1994]; Cachon, 
Camerer, and Johnson [1990]; and Balkenborg [1994] find contradictory evidence. 
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principles (e.g., Cooper et al. [1993]), but we hesitate to jump to 
the possible conclusion that forward induction has no predictive 
power of its own. 
III. COORDINATION IN THE MEDIAN EFFORT GAME 
Table I shows payoffs (in pennies) in the median-effort game 
we studied. The game corresponds to a natural setting in which 
players choose levels of effort in a group production task. The 
median effort determines the group's output; higher medians 
yield higher common payoffs. Players are penalized for deviating 
from the median by exerting too little effort (below the median) 
or too much effort (above the median). The individual goal is to 
exert the median effort. The collective goal is to create the largest 
median effort. 
In their experiments VBB [1991] found with nine players 
that actions in the initial trial of the game were widely distrib- 
uted around a median of 4 or 5. Repeating the game for ten trials 
created convergence to whichever median had occurred in the ini- 
tial trial. This demonstrates the strong influence of precedence: 
a subject expects the others to choose actions on the assumption 
that the median will equal the median of the previous round. Un- 
fortunately, precedence creates substantial coordination failure. 
If everyone had chosen the Pareto-dominant equilibrium, 7, each 
subject would have made substantially more money (nearly $0.50 
more per trial, or $4.50 more in an experiment that lasted about 
an hour and paid $9 on average). 
In VBB [1993] eighteen subjects bid for the right to play the 
median-effort game, in an ascending-price (English) auction. The 
auction ended when only nine subjects were willing to pay 
the announced price. After the auction the nine subjects paid the 
auction price then played. 
Since subjects could always quit bidding during the auction 
and earn nothing, their willingness to pay the price P signals 
their belief that an equilibrium paying at least P will result. Auc- 
tion prices in the first trial were around $2, and subjects invari- 
ably chose actions that gave equilibrium payoffs higher than 
their bids. (Subjects bidding $2.10, for example, would then 
choose 5 or above in the coordination game; to do otherwise would 
violate dominance.) With repeated trials, prices converged very 
close to $2.60, and subjects usually chose the Pareto-efficient ac- 
tion 7. 
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Forward induction explains this behavior, but the English 
auction is not the only preplay mechanism to which forward in- 
duction applies. We used a simpler mechanism. Instead of using 
an auction to create an endogenous cost of participation, we an- 
nounced to nine subjects a publicly known cost to play the game 
(or entry fee) and gave them a chance to opt out and avoid paying 
the cost. (Note, however, that allowing opting out means the 
number of players falls, which may itself improve coordination.) 
We call this the "Opt Out" condition of the median-effort game. 
As the game's entry fee is raised, forward induction eliminates 
more and more of the seven Nash equilibria, facilitating coordina- 
tion on the highest-action equilibria.5 
Loss avoidance can also be applied to the Opt Out game: 
players will not choose actions that are certain to yield a negative 
payoff. For example, with an entry fee of $1.85 a player cannot 
earn a positive profit by choosing an action of 3 or lower, but 
choosing an action of 4 or more does earn a positive profit if the 
outcome median is sufficiently high. Note that loss-avoidance 
yields the same recommendations to players as forward induc- 
tion. In fact, the recommendations of loss-avoidance and forward 
induction always coincide in games in which forward induction 
applies.6 However, unlike forward induction, loss avoidance does 
not require the presence of an option to opt out. Therefore, we 
studied behavior in a "Must Play" condition of the median-effort 
game, in which players were required to pay an entry fee before 
playing the game. Without a chance to opt out, forward induction 
does not apply in the Must Play game. Any coordination improve- 
ment resulting from higher entry costs in the Must Play game 
must be coming from a loss-avoidance selection principle. 
A. Median-Effort Game: Design 
We ran four sessions of the Must Play condition and four ses- 
sions of the Opt Out condition, with nine rounds in each session. 
5. Given the chance to opt out and earn zero, a subject will only play the 
game if the payoff expected in equilibrium, after paying the entry fee, is greater 
than the opportunity cost of opting out (zero). According to forward induction, 
expectations of a high median are justified because only players with high expec- 
tations will play, and they will choose high numbers. Players with low median 
expectations opt out, and they have no influence over the median. 
6. One reader suggested trying to separate loss-avoidance and forward in- 
duction with an Opt Out condition in which players can earn $2.25 and not play, 
or play and pay nothing (as in Cooper et al. [1993] and Schotter, et al. [1994]), so 
there is no explicit entry fee. Forward induction applies in this game, but loss- 
avoidance does too if the opportunity cost of not earning $2.25 is viewed as a loss. 
LOSS AVOIDANCE AND FORWARD INDUCTION 171 
The first three rounds of both conditions were identical, to estab- 
lish an observational baseline and create an empirical median. 
The entry cost was zero, and players could not opt out in either 
condition. In rounds 4-9 subjects could opt out in the Opt Out 
condition, but not in the Must Play condition. Players who chose 
to opt out receive 0 points for the round. 
The entry fee was raised from 0 to $1.85 in rounds 4-6. The 
cost of $1.85 was chosen to keep profits positive (net of entry cost) 
if the initial medians were 4 or 5, as we thought they would be 
based on VBB's results. This change is predicted to be innocuous; 
it tests whether any change in the entry cost can trigger a shift 
to a higher median.7 
The entry cost was raised from $1.85 to $2.25 in rounds 7-9. 
Forward induction predict subjects who opt to play in the Opt 
Out condition will then choose actions 6 or 7 (which pay $2.40 or 
$2.60 in equilibrium). Forward induction predicts nothing about 
the Must Play condition. Loss-avoidance predicts that subjects 
will play 6 or 7 in both Opt Out and Must Play conditions (since 
playing 5 only earns $2.20 in equilibrium, not enough to recoup 
the entry cost of $2.25). Precedence suggests that subjects will 
choose actions corresponding to the median of the previous 
round. 
Subjects were University of Pennsylvania undergraduates 
recruited from announcements in classes and public sign-up 
sheets. Students sat in private cubicles. Each experiment began 
with a public reading of the instructions (see Appendix), and a 
quiz to ensure that each subject understood the task and how 
payoffs were computed. Subjects were paid in cash immediately 
after the experiment. Sessions took 45 minutes, and subjects 
earned about $9 on average. 
In both conditions the subjects did not know the number of 
rounds in the session or the entry costs and options in future 
rounds. In the Must Play condition subjects did not know there 
was an option in other (Opt Out) sessions. Subjects were told 
(truthfully) that they all had the same payoff table, and the pay- 
off table would not change during the experiment. 
Each round began with the experimenter publicly announc- 
7. Cooper et al. [1993] report that the inclusion of a small entry fee, which 
is smaller than the lowest payoff of any equilibrium, does improve coordination. 
Forward induction and loss-avoidance both predict that this should have no effect 
on coordination, so its actual effect represents an interesting puzzle, which is 
probably related to players' use of timing as an inferential device. 
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ing the entry cost and announcing, in the Opt Out sessions, 
whether subjects could opt out and how much they would earn 
for opting out. Subjects then either chose an action or opted out. 
They also predicted the smallest, largest, and median action in 
each round. They earned a dime for each correct prediction, and 
were informed of their correct minimum and maximum predic- 
tions at the end of the experiment. We collected predictions from 
the subjects in order to compare their beliefs about the future 
median with their own actions. At the end of each round, players 
were told the median actions (but not the full distribution of 
actions).8 
B. Median-Effort Game: Results 
Figure I shows the distribution of action choices by the sub- 
jects in each session. In each round of a session (a column) verti- 
cal rectangles outline the range of actions picked during that 
round. Numbers within the rectangle represent the number of 
subjects choosing each action. (The numbers in each column sum 
to nine, the number of subjects.) The open box in each rectangle 
is the median action. The asterisk in each column denotes the 
median of the subject's predictions about the median. 
Behavior across all eight sessions was similar in the first 
three rounds, as expected. There was wide variation in first- 
round actions; by the third round actions always converged to- 
ward a median of 4 or 5; and 71 percent (51 of the 72) subjects 
chose the median in the third round. These results sharply repli- 
cate VBB [1991, 1993] and confirm the strength of precedence. 
When the entry cost rose in round 4 to $1.85, actions shifted 
upward a bit, but the median action was the same in five sessions 
and rose by one in three sessions. The small shift in actions sug- 
gests that changing the entry cost has some influence on beliefs 
and behavior but the influence is minor. 
The crucial comparison between loss-avoidance and forward 
induction comes in rounds 7-9, when the entry cost rises from 
$1.85 to $2.25. Loss-avoidance predicts an increase in actions in 
both conditions, but forward induction predicts an increase only 
in the Opt Out sessions. Must Play and Opt Out conditions 
8. In the Opt Out condition, when the number of subjects playing the game 
was even and the median was in-between two different numbers, a coin was 
flipped to determine which of the two was the announced median. This rule was 
explained to the subjects in the instructions, but there was never a need to imple- 
ment it. 
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Must Play sessions Opt Out sessions 
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Option payoff ua ua ua ua ua ua ua ua ua ua ua ua 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Entry fee 0 0 0 185 185 185 225 225 225 0 0 0 185 185 185 225 225 225 
Session #1 Session #5 
option 6 
721 1 1fE 7 2 
6 31 2jm 
lj2126* 
6221 
n 5 33 4 Si6 7*2 5 m3 75 * 8*8* 




Session #2 Session #6 
option 1 5 
7 3 1 3 5 7 3 1 1 E1 
6 m 2 3* 1 i 6 2 3 Lnff 
g5 3'l 4* 1 1 1 L XX 5 2 [E 
3 E11;X 3 2z1E 
2 l 2 
1 
- 
I I I 
Session #3 Session #7 
option 3 
7 -12 mm~ 7 21 1 5 9 
6 2115**9*E 6 1232113 * 
g5 3 2 1 2 * 5 7* 7* 
4 4* l~ 6* 3 3i4 3 1 
21 2 
1 1 
Session #4 Session #8 
option 1 
72 1 32 2 00 
6 1 4 2 44M2M 6 2 334* 5* 6*3* 
5 3* 4*6*35*73*T1PIM 2 I I 4 2 1 24131G 4 2d 




Action Selections in the Median-Effort Game: Must Play and Opt Out Versions 
showed similar behavior in rounds 7-9: the median increased in 
round 7 in seven out of eight sessions (see Table II). In the final 
rounds there was a total of 18 choices of 6 and 18 choices of 7 in 
the Opt Out sessions, and exactly the same distribution in the 
Must Play sessions. 
Hypothesis testing suggests a modest difference in the Opt 
Out and Must Play conditions. Using a Fisher exact test, we re- 
ject the hypothesis (at p = 0.11) that actions of 6 or 7 are chosen 
with equal probability in round 7 of the two conditions. We can 
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TABLE II 
TIMING OF MEDIAN CHANGES IN THE MEDIAN-EFFORT GAME 
Must Play Opt Out 
(Sessions 1,2,3,4) (Sessions 5,6,7,8) Fraction of 
rounds with a 
No change Change No change Change median change 
First cost 
increase, 
round4: 2 2 3 1 37.5% 
Second cost 
increase, 
round 7: 1 3 0 4 87.5% 
All other rounds, 
no cost increase: 21 3 24 0 6.3% 
TABLE III 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CHOSEN ACTIONS AND PREDICTED 
MEDIANS IN THE MEDIAN-EFFORT GAME 
Must Play Opt Out 
(Session 1,2,3,4) (Sessions 5,6,7,8) 
Rounds Positive Zero Negative Positive Zero Negative 
1-3 12 78 18 18 77 13 
4 7 26 3 5 30 1 
5-6 12 47 3 8 60 4 
7 3 31 2 2 19 0 
8-9 7 64 1 5 66 1 
reject the hypothesis (at p = 0.10) that the distribution of action 
differences between rounds 6 and 7 is the same in the two condi- 
tions. The data suggest that loss-avoidance, absent forward in- 
duction, does not generate precisely the same changes in medians 
(and improvement in coordination) as forward induction does, but 
the changes are quite similar. 
There are several other findings. Table III compares the dif- 
ferences between actions and predicted medians.9 Any nonzero 
differences (e.g., predicting the median would be 4, and playing 
9. Data are pooled across sessions within a condition to improve power. Op- 
tion actions are not included in the table, but subjects made predictions for the 
minimum, maximum, and median even if they opted out. 
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TABLE IV 
BEST RESPONSE DYNAMicS IN THE MEDIAN-EFFoRT GAME 
Must Play Opt Out 
(Session 1,2,3,4) (Sessions 5,6,7,8) 
1,2,3 1,2,3 
Rounds: 4 7 5,6,8,9 4 7 5,6,8,9 
Previous action higher than 
median:* 
Increase or same action: 5 4 24 3 4 16 
Decrease action: 4 1 36 4 0 27 
Previous action is best response: 
Increase action: 11 21 21 9 14 11 
Same action: 11 6 87 14 3 112 
Decrease action: 1 0 2 3 0 3 
Previous action lower than median: 
Increase action: 3 2 31 0 0 27 
Decrease or same action: 1 2 5 2 0 7 
*number of subjects 
5) suggest that subjects did not give careful predictions of the 
median, or did not best-respond to their predicted median. Only 
20 percent of the actions and median predictions were different. 
When they differed, subjects were more likely to choose an action 
higher than their predicted median (a positive difference) than 
vice versa, perhaps trying to pull the group up to a higher me- 
dian. Furthermore, positive differences between actions and ex- 
pectations are evenly distributed among all the rounds. This 
confirms that the increases in median actions observed in round 
7 are caused by rising expectations, rather than by an increased 
willingness to submit actions higher than expectation (which 
would reflect a decrease in best-response actions). 
Table IV gives evidence of convergence dynamics that 
strongly support the influence of precedence.'0 Subjects whose 
actions were higher (lower) than the median in the previous 
10. Crawford [1995] estimates an analytical model to explain convergence 
behavior in these coordination games. A critical assumption of his model is that 
players start with diffuse expectations regarding the median, and through adap- 
tive modification based on observed information (history of repeated play) these 
expectations converge to an equilibrium. The belief data we gathered are roughly 
consistent with Crawford's model, since initial predictions of the median are 
widely dispersed, but they converge tightly around previously observed medians 
with experience. 
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TABLE V 
MEDIAN BELIEFS OF THE SUBJECTS IN ROUND 7 OF THE MEDIAN-EFFORT GAME OPT 
OUT SESSIONS 
Median beliefs of subjects who: 
Opted out Played 
Session 5 5,5,5,5,6,6 6,6,7 
Session 6 4,4,5,6,7 6,6,6,7 
Session 7 5,6,6 6,6,7,7,7,7 
Session 8 6 5,6,6,6,7,7,7,7 
round tended to decrease (increase) their action. Subjects who 
chose the median tended not to change their actions (except in 
rounds 4 and 7, when they often increased). The data explain why 
the initial medians were so persistent: subjects mostly converged 
toward it from above and below, except for some upward drift in 
rounds 4 and 7. (Note that the upward shift is more dramatic in 
round 7, when 80 percent of the subjects shift upward, than 
in round 4 when less than half do.) 
Table V shows some support for forward induction in the me- 
dians predicted by players who chose to opt out or play. The medi- 
ans predicted by subjects who played are higher (95 percent 
predict 6 or 7) than the medians predicted by those who opted out 
(53 percent predicted 5 or less). The two distributions are clearly 
different (X2 = 11.0, p = 0.01), suggesting that some portion of 
subjects may have used reasoning like forward induction to cre- 
ate high expectations. However, forward induction predicts high 
expectations for all subjects, so forward induction is clearly not 
universally applied. But universal application is not necessary 
for improving coordination because the subjects who do not follow 
forward induction opt out, and thus have no influence on the fi- 
nal median. 
C. Median-Effort Game with Private Entry Costs 
Although loss-avoidance explains the behavior observed in 
the Must Play sessions, it is possible that loss avoidance is con- 
founded with another effect. There is substantial evidence in psy- 
chology that people take actions to recoup sunk costs rather than 
ignore them.11 It is possible that the median rises in the median- 
11. There is considerable evidence in psychology that subjects take riskier 
actions to recoup sunk costs. See Arkes and Blumer [1985]; Aronson and Mills 
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effort game merely because each subject chooses a high number 
in an effort to recover the sunk entry fee. 
To separate these explanations, we ran two sessions like the 
Must Play sessions, except that the entry fee was not announced 
publicly (this condition is called "Private Cost"). Each player 
knew his or her own entry fee, but did not know every other sub- 
jects' fee. (In fact, as in the Must Play condition, every subject 
had the same fee.) If subjects individually succumb to the sunk 
cost fallacy, an increase in the entry fees will raise the median 
because the aggregate effect of each subject's attempt to recover 
the fee will result in a higher median. However, if subjects only 
use the loss-avoidance principle to fix their beliefs about how oth- 
ers will play, then in the Private Cost condition actions will not 
rise when the fee is increased. (Note that even if subjects suspect 
others' fees are the same as their own, unless that fact is common 
knowledge the loss-avoidance principle cannot be applied.) 
In fact, the median did not change when the entry fee rose in 
round 7 of the Private Cost sessions (see Figure II). The distribu- 
tion of round 7 actions in the Private Cost sessions is significantly 
different than in the Must Play sessions with public costs (X2 = 
20.4, p = 0.005). The distribution of differences in actions from 
round 6 to 7 is significantly different too (X2 = 11.0, p = 0.005). 
Thus, it appears that subjects do not exhibit a sunk cost fallacy 
in the Must Play setting. 
D. Pass Through Median-Effort Game 
Coordination improved in the Must Play sessions with a pub- 
licly announced entry fee, but loss avoidance requires only losses, 
not charging an explicit fee. Furthermore, it is possible coordina- 
tion would improve in these sessions by merely announcing a 
number (such as 225) which has no influence on the subjects' pay- 
offs. The number itself could be focal. 
To test loss-avoidance without the possibility of contamina- 
tion by a "focal number effect," we conducted two "Pass Through" 
sessions. These sessions are identical to the Must Play sessions, 
but there is no announcement of an entry fee. To incorporate the 
[1959]; Cialdini, Cacioppo, Bassett, and Miller [1978]; Freedman and Fraser [1966], McGlothlin [1956]; and Staw [1976]. Thaler [1980], uses the tendency to- 
ward risk-preference in the domain of losses, from prospect theory [Kahneman 
and Tversky 1979] to explain the sunk cost fallacy. Heath [in press] modifies this 
view with demonstrations that people only spend a different kind of resource to 
recoup a sunk resource cost. 
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Action Selections in the Private Cost Median-Effort Game 
entry fee implicitly, the subjects are told that the payoff table may 
change from round to round. In the first three rounds the Table I 
payoff table is used. In the next three rounds the subjects were 
given a payoff table that was equivalent in structure to Table I, 
but all payoffs were reduced by 185. In the last three rounds the 
subjects used a table with the payoffs reduced by 225. In each 
round the experimenter collected the previous payoff table and 
distributed the new table. Only in rounds 4 and 7 did the payoffs 
in the new tables change. Since the entry fees were implicitly 
incorporated into the payoff table, the subjects did not know any- 
thing about fees or focal numbers. 
Figure III shows that the subjects' behavior in these two Pass 
Through sessions did not differ much from behavior in the Must 
Play sessions. Initial choices are widely dispersed around the me- 
dian of 4 or 5; by round 6 there is rough convergence to an equilib- 
rium (72 percent of subjects select the median action); and in 
round 7 of both sessions there is an upward shift in actions and 
beliefs. We weakly accept the hypothesis that the Pass Through 
and Must Play sessions have the same distribution of actions in 
round 7 and 9 (p = 0.13 and p = 0.15 by Fisher exact test), and 
accept the hypothesis that the two types of sessions have the 
same distribution of median beliefs in round 7 (p = 0.21 by 
Fisher exact test).'2 We conclude that charging an implicit fee can 
affect coordination too, ruling out the theory that our Must Play 
results are due to focal numbers announced as explicit fees. This 
12. We reject that Pass Through and the Must Play sessions have the same 
distribution of action differences in round 7 (p = 0.10 by Fisher exact test), but 
this weakly significant difference is not large in magnitude. 
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FIGURE III 
Action Selections in the Pass Through Median-Effort Game 
provides additional support for loss-avoidance as a selection 
1 1 1 
principle. 
E. Declining Cost Median Effort 
Experience can certainly play a role in coordination. It is pos- 
sible that as subjects gain experience they realize the benefit of 
better coordination. Unfortunately, since an inferior equilibrium 
is established in the early rounds, the subjects need some signal 
to trigger a break from the established equilibrium and initiate 
higher coordination. Any interruption in the normal procedure of 
the game, such as a change in the fee charged, could serve as a 
signal. Indeed, VBB [1990] find evidence that coordination does 
improve when a transition occurs between different treatments 
of the experiment (after some experience has been obtained). We 
conducted two sessions of the "Declining Costs" median-effort 
game in order to rule out experience or transition effects as pri- 
mary explanations for improved coordination in round 7 of the 
Must Play treatments. 
The Declining Costs sessions are identical to the Must Play 
session except the order of fees is reversed: a fee of 225 in the 
first three rounds, 185 in the middle three rounds, and no fee in 
the last three rounds. Beginning round 1 with the high fee of 225 
eliminates transition or experience effects as an explanation for 
the improvement in coordination in round 7 that we observed in 
the Must Play sessions.'3 
13. Again, we do not entirely reject the possibility of significant experience 
or transition effects in round 7. Instead, we wish to show that these are not the 
sole explanation for higher coordination when a high fee of 225 is charged. 
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Action Selections in the Declining Cost Median-Effort Game 
Figure IV shows the distribution of actions selected in the 
Declining Cost sessions. They indicate that higher coordination 
is achieved in round 1 (with a fee of 225) than in the first round 
of the Must Play sessions (with a fee of zero). The distribution of 
actions and median predictions are higher in the Declining Costs 
sessions (X2 = 10.16,p = 0.005; and x2 = 10.99,p = 0.005). Fur- 
thermore, we accept the hypothesis that the distribution of ac- 
tions in round 7 of the Declining Costs and Must Play sessions 
are the same (Fisher exact test, p = 0.29). We conclude that sub- 
jects apply loss-avoidance even with no experience, and loss- 
avoidance can assist in the prediction of subjects' beliefs prior to 
playing a coordination game. 
F. Minimum-Effort Game 
In the median-effort game each member's payoff depends on 
the group's median effort (as in tug-of-war). One slacker has little 
overall influence on the payoffs if others put in high effort. In 
the "minimum-effort" game a player's payoff is determined by the 
minimum number chosen in the group and the deviation of his or 
her number from the minimum. (This game is sometimes called 
the "weakest link" game after the expression, "A chain is only as 
strong as its weakest link.") In the minimum-effort game coordi- 
nation is more difficult because players will choose a high action 
only if they believe every other player will choose a high action 
too. In previous experiments, inefficient equilibria of 1 are typical 
with groups of three to sixteen subjects playing repeatedly [VBB 
1990; Knez and Camerer 1994]. 
We conducted some experiments with the minimum-effort 
game because it stress tests the ability of loss-avoidance to im- 
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Action Selections in the Minimum-Effort Game: Must Play and Opt Out 
Versions 
prove coordination and might reveal a bigger difference between 
loss-avoidance and forward induction than we saw with the me- 
dian effort game. As in the median-effort game, the predictions of 
loss-avoidance and forward induction are identical in the 
minimum-effort game, but the subjects' belief in these concepts 
must be stronger (and more uniform) for coordination to improve 
when the fees are raised. 
We tested Must Play and Opt Out conditions of the minimum 
effort game. The payoff table used was identical to the one in the 
median-effort game (see Table I), but experimental procedures 
differed in three ways. First, the minimum action chosen, not the 
median, was announced at the end of each round and was used 
to calculate payoffs. (The full distribution of actions was never 
announced.) Second, subjects were asked to make a prediction for 
the minimum action, rather than the median. Third, subjects 
were given $8 before the session began to prevent them from los- 
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ing money.4 
Figure V shows the subjects' choices in two Must Play and 
two Opt Out sessions of the minimum-effort game. Behavior in 
the two conditions was dramatically different. Raising the entry 
cost did not help in Must Play, but it did help in Opt Out. 
The hypotheses of equal distributions in action choices in round 
14. This cash stake was provided because in a pilot session of the Must Play 
condition with no stake many subjects became risk-seeking (choosing high actions 
when the previous round's minimum was 1) when their total earnings became 
negative. The pattern of the actual minimum in the pilot did not differ from the 
two sessions with the cash stake. In two pilot sessions of the Opt Out condition 
without the $8 stake, total payoffs of the subjects did not become negative, and 
behavior was similar to the sessions reported. 
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7, and action differences from round 6 to 7, can both be easily 
rejected (X2 = 24.9, p = 0.005; and x2 = 14.0, p = 0.005). Thus, 
loss-avoidance alone (in Must Play) is not enough to generate co- 
ordination on high equilibria in the minimum-effort game, but 
loss-avoidance and forward induction together (in Opt Out) do 
improve coordination. For example, in session 13 only one subject 
opted out in round 7; that player then opted to play in rounds 
8 and 9. 
Comparison across experiments shows that round 1 choices 
are significantly lower in the minimum-effort game than in the 
median-effort game (X2 = 13.3, p = 0.005). The initial difference 
persists. Actions in round 7 and round 9 Must Play sessions are 
significantly different across the minimum and median games 
(X2 = 30.9, p = 0.005, and x2 = 45.8, p = 0.005 respectively), but 
in the minimum and median Opt Out sessions all choices in these 
rounds are 6 or 7. 
Loss-avoidance does have some effect in the minimum effort 
game, even though it is not strong enough to overcome prece- 
dence. In round 3 of the Must Play sessions only 16 percent of the 
actions were 4 or greater. When the entry cost was raised to $1.85 
in round 4, 72 percent of the subjects chose 4 or greater. This 
behavior is also seen in Table VI, which shows convergence dy- 
namics. Subjects who chose an action above the previous round's 
minimum were likely to lower their action choice, except in 
TABLE VI 
BEST RESPONSE DYNAMIcS IN THE MINIMUM-EFFoRT GAME 




Rounds: 4 7 5,6,8,9 4 7 5,6,8,9 
Previous action higher than previous minimum: 
Increase or same action: 9 11 31 7 2 20 
Decrease action: 0 2 55 1 0 28 
Previous action equals previous minimum: 
Increase action: 8 4 6 5 12 2 
Same action: 1 1 15 0 0 48 
Decrease action: 0 0 1 0 0 0 
*number of subjects. 
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rounds 4 and 7. In rounds 4 and 7 there was a tendency for sub- 
jects to raise their action choices, but the tendency was not strong 
enough to budge the minimum because at least one subject 
picked the same action (or less) in each round. 
A clue to the coordination success in the Opt Out sessions is 
found in the minima predicted by subjects who opted out or 
played. As in the median-effort game, the three subjects who 
played in round 7 had significantly higher beliefs about the mini- 
mum (thirteen of fourteen thought it would be 6) than the sub- 
jects who opted out (only one of four thought it would be 6), as 
forward induction predicts (X2 = 8.3, p = 0.025). The more opti- 
mistic beliefs of the subjects who actually played generates coor- 
dination on a higher equilibrium. 
One feature of our design may overstate the case for forward 
induction in the minimum effort game. In the Opt Out condition 
the fact that players can Opt Out implies that fewer players actu- 
ally play, which reduces strategic uncertainty and makes coordi- 
nation easier. (For example, VBB [1990] and Knez and Camerer 
[1994] found that in two-player minimum-effort games coordina- 
tion was much better than in games with 3-16 players. However, 
in those experiments, subjects were aware of the number of their 
opponents, whereas in the Opt Out sessions they must form ex- 
pectations regarding the number that will play.) The VBB auction 
design cleverly fixed the number of players, for precisely this rea- 
son, but it has not been applied to minimum-effort games.'5 
IV. DISCUSSION 
Our experiments help understand how people play coordina- 
tion games. First, subjects repeatedly played a coordination 
game, the median-effort game studied by VBB [1991], which has 
seven pure-strategy equilibria that are Pareto-ranked. They 
gravitated systematically to either of two (inefficient) equilibria. 
Then we altered payoffs by imposing a fee on subjects. We 
imposed fees in two different conditions, called Must Play and 
Opt Out. In Must Play experiments, all subjects had to pay the 
15. In VBB's auction design, the number of players who actually played the 
coordination game was held fixed because eighteen subjects bid for nine spots in 
the game. A hybrid of their design and ours, in which we charge players a fee, 
allows them to opt out, but to fix the number of actual players (if too many opt 
out, then they do not play) would hold strategic uncertainty fixed in our fixed- 
fee design. 
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fee. In Opt Out experiments, subjects could pay the fee and play 
the coordination game (with others who had paid), or could opt 
not to play and earn nothing. 
Notice that in the Opt Out conditions, the logic of forward 
induction and the loss-avoidance selection principle both predict 
movement to a better equilibrium when a fee is imposed. But in 
Must Play conditions forward induction does not apply because 
all subjects must pay the fee. Since we observe shifts in equilib- 
rium in both conditions, we conclude that loss-avoidance is an 
effective selection principle in these games. 
Two further kinds of evidence suggest that the power of for- 
ward induction is not wholly derived from loss-avoidance. First, 
forward induction predicts that subjects who opt in and play will 
have more optimistic beliefs about the resulting behavior of oth- 
ers than subjects who opt out. By measuring subjects' expecta- 
tions directly, we saw that this was true. However, forward 
induction is not applied by everyone, because many subjects 
chose to opt out (though usually for only one round). 
Second, we experimented with a "minimum-action" or weak- 
link game, in which coordination among all subjects is required 
to achieve the Pareto superior equilibrium. In Must Play condi- 
tions, loss-avoidance by itself did not work well enough, and sub- 
jects failed to achieve a profitable equilibrium (payoffs were 
below the fee). But in Opt Out conditions, the combination of loss- 
avoidance and forward induction enabled subjects to reach an 
equilibrium yielding more than the fee. So there is some evidence 
that forward induction, by modifying the beliefs of subjects who 
choose to play a game, enhances coordination better than the 
loss-avoidance principle alone can. 
Thus, our central conclusion is that loss-avoidance is an im- 
portant selection principle in its own right. Forward induction 
appears to have some predictive power beyond loss-avoidance, 
but the available data on forward induction are all clearly mixed, 
and further research is needed to say more. 
Three variants of the median-effort game were used to clarify 
our understanding of loss-avoidance. First, we demonstrate that 
loss-avoidance improves coordination even when subjects have no 
experience playing a game (in our Declining Cost sessions). This 
is important because, as shown by Crawford and Haller [1990] 
and Crawford [1995], subjects' beliefs prior to playing a coordina- 
tion game can influence which equilibrium they eventually coor- 
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dinate upon.16 Second, the effect is distinct from a "bell-ringing 
effect," in which any change during the experiment serves as a 
device players can use to coordinate a mass switch to a better 
equilibrium17 because the effect occurs even when the fee is sub- 
tracted from payoffs rather than announced (Pass Through ses- 
sions). Third, and most importantly, loss avoidance is a selection 
principle rather than an individual-level response to possible 
losses, like the "sunk cost fallacy" or reflection effect. We estab- 
lished this in Private Costs sessions in which the fee each subject 
paid was only privately known, rather than commonly known. 
In these sessions, raising the fee did not change behavior, so we 
conclude that loss-avoidance modifies a subject's belief regarding 
how other subjects will play a game. 
V. REMARKS ABOUT Loss-AvoIDANCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
We remark about two features of loss-avoidance as a selec- 
tion principle and one implication. 
1. Notice that if a game has some Pareto-ranked equilibria, 
subtracting a constant from all payoffs, and applying loss- 
avoidance, will exclude the lowest Pareto-ranked equilibria first. 
As the constant is increased, higher ranked equilibria are ex- 
cluded, but better equilibria are never excluded before worse 
ones. So loss-avoidance naturally guides people toward efficiency. 
Hence, while loss-avoidance may be rooted in an individual ten- 
dency to distinguish losses and gains (which may be debatably 
rational), it clearly improves social rationality, by helping people 
move in the direction of higher-payoff equilibria. 
2. Since loss-avoidance affects equilibrium selection, ac- 
counting manipulations that post costs at different periods of 
time, and mental accounting rules for coding or framing outcomes 
[Thaler 1993] can have real effects on behavior and efficiency. 
Our data illustrate this possibility concretely. Charging a fee in 
the first three periods (in the Declining Cost sessions) created a 
16. In their work these authors assume that subjects begin with diffuse prior 
beliefs which they do not attempt to explain. Loss-avoidance explains part of these 
initial beliefs. 
17. A focal number effect suggests that coordination could improve by the 
announcement of a number which has no monetary consequence. See Mehta, 
Starmer, and Sugden [1994] for a discussion of focal principles in pure coordina- 
tion games. 
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high-payoff equilibrium in those periods, which persisted 
throughout the experiment due to the effect of precedent. In con- 
trast, charging the $2.25 fee at the end (in Must Play sessions) 
permitted low-payoff equilibrium choices before the fee was im- 
posed. On average, subjects earned substantially more in the De- 
clining Costs sessions than in the Must Play sessions ($9.54 
versus $7.54). Even though total fees imposed were the same, 
when the fees were imposed made a large difference. 
3. Our results have one important implication for experimen- 
tal design: whether payoffs are gains or losses could matter. Ex- 
perimentalists usually adjust the payoffs in games or markets so 
that the expected payoff (under equilibrium predictions) is close 
to the opportunity wage of subjects, and is large enough to moti- 
vate subjects to think carefully about their choices. Less attention 
is paid to the range of payoffs, and especially to the possibility of 
losses.18 Our data suggest that in situations with multiple equi- 
libria, and common knowledge of payoffs, the range of payoffs is 
important because money-losing outcomes are less likely to be 
chosen. In the stag-hunt game, for example, previous experi- 
ments show strong support for the risk-dominant equilibrium 
and little support for the payoff-dominant equilibrium [Cooper et 
al. 1992a]. We conjecture that subtracting a constant from payoffs 
(and giving subjects a compensating fixed payment in advance) 
will reverse this result, shifting support to the payoff-dominant 
equilibrium. 
APPENDIX 
Instructions are shown for the Must Play, Opt Out, Private 
Cost, Pass Through, and Declining Costs sessions of the median 
effort game sessions. Text in normal typeface is common to all 
sessions. Text in italics is specific to a subset of the sessions. Any 
reference to "the TABLE COST" is replaced with "your PRIVATE 
TABLE COST" in the Private Cost sessions. 
The minimum-effort game session instructions are not 
shown because they are similar to the median-effort game session 
18. There is recent evidence (with old roots) that avoiding losses motivates 
subjects more than increasing gains does, in probability matching experiments 
[Smith and Walker 1993], the "beauty contest" game [Ho, Weigelt, and Camerer 
1995], and Rubinstein's "electronic mail game" [Camerer, Blecherman, and 
Goldstein 1995]. 
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instructions. In the minimum-effort game the section "Calculat- 
ing the Median" is not included, and all references to the median 
action are changed to the minimum action. 
After the instructions a sample quiz sheet is included. This 
quiz was given to each of the participants after the reading of the 
instructions in order to ensure that each person understood the 
game. The quiz included is for the Opt Out median-effort game 
sessions. The other sessions were given a similar quiz. A sample 
response sheet from the Opt Out median-effort game is also 
included. 
INSTRUCTIONS 
Welcome to a Decision Sciences experiment which is funded 
by a research grant. You are participating in an experiment in 
which you have the opportunity to earn cash. The actual amount 
of cash you earn depends on your choices and the choices of the 
other persons in the experiment. You should have, in addition to 
the instructions, one page labeled RESPONSE SHEET and one 
page labeled PAYOFF TABLE. 
CALCULATING THE MEDIAN 
It is important in this experiment that you understand how 
to calculate the median of a group of numbers. The median of a 
list of numbers is the number for which half of the numbers are 
lower and half of the numbers are higher. A simple method to 
determine this number is as follows. First, sort the numbers in 
the list from smallest to largest. With this list eliminate the 
smallest and largest choice in succession until only one number 
remains. This remaining value is the median of the list. For ex- 
ample, if you have the list (45, 53, 51, 47, 47), you would first sort 
in ascending order: (45, 47, 47, 51, 53). Next, eliminate smallest 
and highest values in succession: (47, 47, 51) ... (47). This pro- 
cess tells you that 47 is the median of the list (45, 53, 51, 47, 47). 
HOW THE EXPERIMENT IS CONDUCTED 
The experiment is conducted in rounds. In each round you 
will earn points which will be converted to cash at the end of 
the experiment. 
For Opt Out session: 
A round begins with the experimenter announcing the 
OPTION VALUE and the TABLE COST These numbers will 
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influence the number of points you earn in the round. After 
this announcement you must either choose a number between 
1 and 7 or choose the OPTION. Your decision will be referred 
to as YOUR ACTION for the round. 
After each of the nine participants in the experiment has 
chosen an action, the experimenter will announce the ME- 
DIAN SELECTED NUMBER which is the median number 
selected from among the nine participants who select a num- 
ber as their action. The subjects who select the OPTION have 
no influence over the MEDIAN SELECTED NUMBER. 
For Must Play, Private Costs, and Declining Costs sessions: 
A round begins with the experimenter announcing the 
[PRIVATE] TABLE COST This number will influence the 
number of points you earn in the round. After the announce- 
ment of the [PRIVATE] TABLE COST, you must choose a 
number between 1 and 7. This number will be referred to as 
YOUR NUMBER ACTION for the round. 
After each of the nine participants in the experiment have 
chosen a number action, the experimenter will announce the 
MEDIAN SELECTED NUMBER which is the median num- 
ber selected from among the nine participants. 
For Pass Through sessions: 
After a round begins you must choose a number between 
1 and 7. This number will be referred to as YOUR NUMBER 
ACTION for the round. 
After each of the nine participants in the experiment have 
chosen a number action, the experimenter will announce the 
MEDIAN SELECTED NUMBER which is the median num- 
ber selected from among the nine participants. 
After the announcement of the MEDIAN SELECTED NUM- 
BER, each person should determine their point payoff from the 
round and then the next round begins. Each round of the experi- 
ment will be conducted in the same manner. 
DETERMINING YOUR POINT PAYOFF 
For Opt Out sessions: 
If you choose OPTION as YOUR ACTION for the round, 
then the points you earn equal the OPTION VALUE. If you 
choose a number between 1 and 7 as your action, then the 
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points you earn for the round are a function of YOUR AC- 
TION, the TABLE COST, and the MEDIAN SELECTED 
NUMBER. 
For Must Play, Private Costs, and Declining Costs sessions: 
The points you earn for the round are a function of YOUR 
ACTION, the [PRIVATE] TABLE COST, and the MEDIAN 
SELECTED NUMBER. 
For the Pass Through sessions: 
The points you earn for the round are a function of YOUR 
ACTION and the MEDIAN SELECTED NUMBER. 
The PAYOFF TABLE will allow you to use these three numbers 
to determine your exact payoff. Please look at the table now. 
First, find the row corresponding to YOUR NUMBER ACTION 
and then the column corresponding to the MEDIAN SELECTED 
NUMBER. Your point payoff is listed in the box which is the in- 
tersection of the row and column. 
For Opt Out, Must Play, Private Cost, and Declining Costs 
sessions: 
However, your final POINT PAYOFF is this number mi- 
nus the TABLE COST 
For example, the following table lists several combinations 
of choices and medians: 
For Opt Out, Must Play, Declining Costs, and Private Costs: 
YOUR MEDIAN YOUR 
NUMBER SELECTED PAYOFF 
ACTION NUMBER 
1 1 140 minus the [PRIVATE] TABLE 
COST 
3 3 180 minus the [PRIVATE] TABLE 
COST 
3 5 180 minus the [PRIVATE] TABLE 
COST 
5 5 220 minus the [PRIVATE] TABLE 
COST 
5 3 140 minus the [PRIVATE] TABLE 
COST 
7 7 260 minus the [PRIVATE] TABLE 
COST 
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For the Pass Through sessions: 
YOUR MEDIAN YOUR 
NUMBER SELECTED PAYOFF 
ACTION NUMBER 
1 1 -85 minus the TABLE COST 
3 3 -45 minus the TABLE COST 
3 5 -45 minus the TABLE COST 
5 5 -5 minus the TABLE COST 
5 3 -85 minus the TABLE COST 
7 7 35 minus the TABLE COST 
SUMMARY 
For Opt Out sessions: 
At the beginning of the round the experimenter announces 
the OPTION VALUE and the TABLE COST Each person 
then chooses an action. If the OPTION is chosen as an action, 
then the OPTION VALUE is the points earned for the round. 
Note, if the OPTION is selected then the points earned for the 
round do not depend on either the TABLE COST, or MEDIAN 
SELECTED NUMBER. 
If a number between 1 through 7 is selected as the action 
of the round, then the points earned depend on this number, 
the TABLE COST, and the MEDIAN SELECTED NUMBER. 
After each person has selected an action, the MEDIAN 
SELECTED NUMBER is determined and announced. Note 
that the MEDIAN SELECTED NUMBER is the median of 
the number actions. In other words, those subjects choosing 
the OPTION do not influence the median since they did not 
pick a number. 
After the announcement of the MEDIAN SELECTED 
NUMBER, each person can determine the points they have 
earned in the round. 
For Must Play, Declining Costs, and Private Costs sessions: 
At the beginning of the round the experimenter announces 
the [PRIVATE] [PRIVATE TABLE COST]. Each person then 
chooses a number between 1 through 7. After each person has 
selected an action, the MEDIAN SELECTED NUMBER is de- 
termined and announced. After this announcement each per- 
son can determine the points they have earned in the round. 
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For Pass Through sessions: 
At the beginning of the round each person chooses a num- 
ber between 1 through 7. After each person has selected an 
action, the MEDIAN SELECTED NUMBER is determined 
and announced. After this announcement each person can de- 
termine the points they have earned in the round. 
At this point the next round begins, or the experiment is ended. 
COMMENTS 
Each person has the same PAYOFF TABLE, and this will be 
the same PAYOFF TABLE in each round of the experiment. 
For Must Play, Opt Out, and Declining Costs sessions: 
Each person has the same TABLE COST 
For Private Entry Cost sessions: 
Each person's PRIVATE TABLE COST may or may not 
be different in each round. You will be informed of your PRI- 
VATE TABLE COST but not the PRIVATE TABLE COST of 
any other player Furthermore, your PRIVATE TABLE COST 
may or may not change from round to round. 
For Opt Out sessions: 
Each person has the same OPTION VALUE and 
TABLE COST 
When choosing YOUR NUMBER ACTION, notice that you 
are choosing the row from which your point payoff will be deter- 
mined in the PAYOFF TABLE. The column is determined only 
after everyone has selected a number and the experimenter has 
announced the median number selected. 
For Opt Out Condition: 
In some rounds the OPTION VALUE may be announced 
as "not available" or "N.A." In this round no subject can 
choose the OPTION, and therefore all nine subjects must 
choose a number between 1 and 7. 
Due to choices of the OPTION there may be only an even 
number of numbers chosen. When there are only an even num- 
ber of numbers in a list the median may not be uniquely de- 
fined. For example in the list (11, 12, 13, 14) the median can 
be either 12 or 13. If this occurs then the experimenter will 
flip a coin to determine the median. 
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PREDICTIONS 
In addition to choosing an action in each round, you must 
also make three predictions for the round. In the columns titled 
YOUR PREDICTIONS: MIN MAX MEDIAN record your predic- 
tions for the lowest, highest and median choice, respectively, of 
all the number actions in the experiment for the given round. For 
example, your minimum prediction should be what you think will 
be the lowest number action taken during the round. Similarly, 
your maximum prediction should be the highest number action 
you think anyone will take during the round. Finally, your me- 
dian prediction should be what you think will be the median of 
the nine number actions. Note that this is your prediction for the 
median and that your point payoff is based on the actual median. 
For every correct prediction you will earn 10 points. The experi- 
menter will tell you the number of correct predictions you have 
made at the end of the experiment. 
At the end of the experiment total up the points you have 
earned. Calculate the dollars you have earned based on the ex- 
change rate of one point = $0.01 (a penny). 
PLEASE DO NOT TALK DURING THE EXPERIMENT. ASK 
QUESTIONS AT ANY TIME. 
FUQUA SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, DUKE UNIVERSITY 
DIVISION OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
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